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The passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988 served 
as a catalyst for renewed political opposition to Native sovereignty movements 
throughout the United States.1 Integral to this opposition has been the use of 
reverse racism arguments to challenge laws recognizing Native rights to sover-
eignty and self-determination. The opposition has been articulated through nu-
merous coalitions including church and neighborhood groups, non-profit 
citizen and property rights organizations, state representatives, gaming industry 
executives, and political lobbyists. While these different groups and individuals 
have unique political agendas, interests, and objectives, on the question of Na-
tive rights they have shared an argument that treaty and federal Indian law pro-
vide Native peoples with unfair economic opportunities, means and access to 
lands, and tax loopholes solely on the basis of race. Reflecting anti-civil rights 
perspectives, and often paralleling anti-affirmative action efforts, their specific 
objective is the repeal of these laws. As the Citizens for Equal Rights Alliance/ 
Citizens for Equal Rights Foundation's website asserts, "Federal Indian policy 
is unaccountable, destructive, racist and unconstitutional. It is therefore CERA 
and CERF's mission to ensure 'the equal protection of the law' so that this 
nation of many cultures may be one people living under one constitutional sys-
tem of laws."2 
Drawing from Native legal and critical race studies, this article examines 
the discourse of reverse racism constituting anti-Native sovereignty movements 
in the post-IGRA moment of U.S. politics. It pays attention to how the move-
ments have gained momentum through calls for the repeal of treaty and federal 
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Indian laws on the grounds that they provide racially discriminatory resources, 
services, benefits, and advantages to Native peoples. It argues that the 
racialization3 of Native peoples as both "special interest groups" and as ethnic 
minorities undermines their unique legal status under U.S. and international law 
as "indigenous peoples." The article hopes to provide a forum for thinking 
through oppositional strategies needed to reaffirm and reassert Native rights to 
sovereignty and self-determination. 
I. Legal Foundations 
The Constitution of Recognition 
Informed by international law regarding the rights of "indigenous peoples" 
to self-government and territorial integrity, the United States Constitution, which 
was ratified in 1791, recognized that "Indian tribes" had a unique legal status 
and commensurate rights as "sovereigns."4 Article 1, Section 8 stipulated that 
Congress had the power to regulate commerce—that is, was required to main-
tain a direct relationship—with Indian tribes for the purposes of negotiating the 
terms of trade, jurisdiction, territorial rights, military alliances, and passage. It 
inferred that this relationship could not be interfered with by states or foreign 
nations. Article 1, Section 2 acknowledged the separation of tribal governments 
and their citizens from the United States.5 Given that tribes were without repre-
sentation in Congress, they were also recognized to be exempt from taxation by 
Congress. 
Equally important, the Constitution provided that treaties were to be re-
garded, along with the Constitution and Congressional legislation, as the "su-
preme Law of the Land" that demanded respect by "Judges in every State." 
Through the ratification of 371 treaties with tribes from 1778 to 1871, the United 
States Congress affirmed the status of tribes as sovereigns and obligated U.S. 
courts to adhere to the terms of the treaties.6 
The U.S. Constitution established the legal foundations for what is now 
known as federal recognition policy. Recognition refers to that body of law that 
has acknowledged that Indian tribes possess certain rights based on and 
emanating from their unique legal status as tribes. These rights have been enu-
merated in treaties, Congressional legislation, and Supreme Court rulings to 
establish a guarantee by the United States of a direct tribal-federal relationship, 
non-interference by states and foreign nations in matters of tribal self-govern-
ment and territorial integrity, and tribal exemption from federal and state taxa-
tion. Following the early nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions known as 
the Marshall Trilogy,7 the obligation of the United States to guarantee and pro-
tect these rights has been known as the trust responsibility.8 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is charged with administering the terms 
of this responsibility to "Indian tribes" and "Alaskan Native villages"9 (herein 
tribes).10 The responsibility, as defined in treaties and federal law, includes the 
protection of tribal rights to self government, the management of tribal lands 
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and assets, and the provision of particular services, programs, and funds to aid 
tribes in economic development, government operations, and cultural preserva-
tion.11 Those specific tribes with whom the United States has acknowledged a 
trust responsibility are said to be recognized. Currently, there are 561 tribes 
with federal recognition status.12 
However, an estimated one-third of the tribes within the United States are 
without federal recognition status.13 Some of the reasons why tribes are unrec-
ognized include the fact that they have never signed a treaty with the United 
States, that treaties that they had signed have never been ratified by Congress, 
or that they have lost appeals for recognition to Congress, the Supreme Court, 
or the BIA (the specific mechanisms by which recognition is said to be estab-
lished).14 Moreover, about 110 tribes lost recognition under House Concurrent 
Resolution (HCR) 108, known as the Termination Act, of 1953, including sixty-
two tribes in Oregon, the Flathead Tribe of Montana, the Menominee Tribe of 
Wisconsin, the Potowatami Tribes of Kansas and Nebraska, the Ponca Tribe of 
Indians of Oklahoma, and the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe of North Da-
kota.15 (Forty-one tribes in California were terminated under a related state law 
passed in 1958.) These acts dissolved tribal governments by unilateral cession 
of their relations with the BIA. They also liquidated all tribal assets and reser-
vation lands for per capita distribution. Terminated tribes have to appeal 
directly to Congress for reinstatement. According to the General Accounting 
Office (GAO), as of October 2001, only 37 of the 110 terminated tribes have 
had their status restored by Congress. 
In 1978, the BIA established regulations for granting recognition to tribes 
who had never been recognized. Administered by the Branch of 
Acknowledgement and Research (BAR), the Federal Acknowledgement Pro-
gram (FAP) determines the eligibility of tribes for recognition on the basis of 
seven criteria, including that the tribe is identified by reliable external sources 
as a continuous entity since 1900; has maintained itself as a distinct, historically 
continuous community; has maintained political authority over its members from 
"historic times until the present"; has a governing document describing its op-
erations and membership criteria; and that current members are descendants of 
a historic or amalgamated tribe that has functioned as an autonomous political 
unit.16 Despite FAP changes in 1994,1997, and 2000, FAP's requirements have 
been unevenly applied. While decisions have been made quickly for some tribes, 
recognition applications for others have had to wait for several years only to be 
denied recognition without an explanation as to what would be required to suc-
ceed upon appeal.17 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act, 
which requires that the BIA "publish in the Federal Register a list of all Indian 
tribes which the Secretary recognizes to be eligible for the special programs 
and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as 
Indians" (since amended to include Alaskan Natives and Native Hawaiians). 
The act stipulates that tribes may be recognized by an act of Congress, follow-
136 Joanne Barker 
ing FAP administrative procedures, or by a decision of a United States court. 
Recognized tribes are placed on a BIA list that is "used by various departments 
and agencies of the United States to determine the eligibility of certain groups 
to receive services from the United States." These services include housing and 
business loans, health care funding through the Indian Health Service, and edu-
cation grants. Inclusion on the list also requires federal consultation with tribal 
representatives on the development and implementation of policies and 
programs that affect tribes. Included among these are conservation projects 
managed by United States Fish and Wildlife Services, management of an emer-
gencies with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), programs 
of the Federal Highway Administration, and the National Parks Service's 
oversight responsibilities for the Native American Graves Protection and Repa-
triation Act of 1990. In the development of policy, programs, and their imple-
mentation, Executive Order (EO) #13175 requires federal agencies to consult 
with tribes who are included on the BIA's list of recognized tribes. Accordingly, 
tribes who lose their recognition by Congressional act or court decision are to 
be removed from the list, and so are removed from all services and consultation 
procedures required by the law. 
As a result of inconsistencies in the determination and application of fed-
eral recognition policies, hundreds of Native groups within the United States 
are without legal standing as tribes. In California alone, the state with the larg-
est population of Native peoples in the United States, this involves about 50 of 
the state's approximately 150 tribes. Unrecognized tribes and their members do 
not qualify for any of the services, benefits, protections, or exemptions pro-
vided to recognized tribes. This prevents them from being able to claim legal 
rights of access to lands (territories, resources, sacred sites), means to economic 
development (business loans), funding for cultural retention programs (educa-
tion, language, repatriation), social services (health care, day care, housing), 
and political participation in the multiple forums within the United States where 
policies affecting Native peoples are developed. 
Recognition by Gaming 
During the 1970s and 1980s, tribal gaming facilities on reservation lands 
led to an increasing number of legal conflicts between tribes and states.18 These 
conflicts focused on questions about the extent of state jurisdiction over tribal 
lands,19 but in a broader sense they were really about the scope of tribal sover-
eignty in relationship to states. If a state did not permit gambling, could tribes, 
as sovereigns, ignore state law and establish gaming facilities if they desired? In 
both Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth (1981),20 and California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987),21 the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and the U.S. Supreme Court said that they could. 
In response to state concerns about tribal gaming, and tribal concerns over 
maintaining jurisdiction over reservation lands, Congress enacted IGRA. IGRA 
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mandates that states enter into "good faith" negotiations with tribes interested 
in opening high-stakes gaming facilities.22 Generally, the resulting agreements, 
or compacts, allow tribes to establish gaming facilities under existing or amended 
state law, provided that the tribes pay a percentage of their annual profits to the 
state to compensate infrastructure costs. IGRA also strictly regulates how tribes 
can spend gaming revenue. Moneys must be used to fund tribal government 
operations and programs, provide for the general welfare of the tribe and its 
members, promote tribal economic development, donate to charitable organi-
zations, or help fund operations of local government agencies. Tribes can pay 
per capita amounts to enrolled members, provided that the tribe has prepared a 
plan to allocate the revenue, the plan is approved by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, and the interests of minors are protected and payments are disbursed to 
parents or legal guardians. To monitor compliance, IGRA established the Na-
tional Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC).23 
Initially, controversies over IGRA were dominated by players in the gam-
ing industry. Since 1988, tribal gaming economies have grown to almost $19 
billion annually. Anti-gaming efforts have likewise grown to include a much 
more diverse range of constituencies. Despite that diversity, anti-gaming move-
ments have shared an appeal to "reverse racism" arguments that racialize Na-
tives as "special interest groups" and/or disadvantaged ethnic minorities out to 
"play the race card" in order to "take advantage" of "unfair" federal laws en-
abling them to practically monopolize economic opportunities in gaming. 
For instance, in California in 1999, Governor Gray Davis signed 61 gam-
ing compacts. Under these agreements, which expire in 2020, tribes can operate 
facilities with up to a total of 2,000 slot machines. In 2000, Proposition 1 A, the 
Indian Self-Reliance Act, amended the state's constitution to allow for other 
Class III operations by Indian tribes. The act also created the Revenue Sharing 
Trust Fund, which is administered by the California Gambling Control Com-
mission. Tribes with more than 350 slot machines pay a percentage of their 
quarterly profits from slots into the fund, which are then distributed to tribes 
without gaming facilities and tribes that operate fewer than 350 machines. Ap-
proximately 70 percent of all tribes are eligible to receive payments because 
only about 30 percent operate facilities that require revenue sharing. According 
to the November 2005 Commission's report on the quarter ending September 
30,2005, $8.14 million had been deposited. Distributions to non-compact tribes 
were $116,413 each. From July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2005, a total of $146.38 
million had been distributed.24 
As a result of gaming profits and revenue sharing, California tribes have 
been able to reacquire a modest amount of lost lands, establish cultural centers 
and museums, expand businesses, support local governments, donate to chari-
table organizations, hire upwards of 200,000 employees (the majority of whom 
are non-Native), and provide housing, education, and health care to their mem-
bers. However, Natives in California remain among the state's most economi-
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cally diverse communities. As has been the case throughout the country, while a 
few tribes have done extraordinarily well since 1999, many are still without 
electricity, water, phone/cable lines, paved roads, or even access to emergency 
care or medical facilities. Despite this, tribes have experienced a "backlash" 
against not only their gaming activities but all issues related to their economic 
development, land reacquisition, and increasing clout in state politics.25 
In 2003, California's gubernatorial recall campaign was focused sharply 
by public outrage over the state's energy crisis and feelings of having been 
fleeced by Enron and state politicians whose fraud contributed to if not caused 
the state's escalating budget deficit and bleak economic outlook.26 Republican 
candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger won quick popular support by promising to 
bring about a true, "no-nonsense," reform of state politics and economics led by 
and for "the people." This came as he was able to distance himself from Gover-
nor Gray Davis and Democratic opponent Lt. Governor Cruz Bustamante on a 
number of key issues that he focused on tribal gaming.27 Tribal gaming allowed 
Schwarzenegger to share in the moral outrage and righteous indignation that 
characterized public debate over the state's economic crisis while deflecting 
attention onto tribes and away from his own circle of influence, which included 
a number of President George W. Bush's advisors and Enron and other energy 
executives who were directing and funding the recall effort.28 
Schwarzenegger promised to put an end to what he characterized as the 
corruption and conniving of influence of gaming tribes on state politics and 
politicians. As Bustamante was being denigrated and eventually discredited by 
the media for taking campaign contributions from some of the more affluent 
gaming tribes, Schwarzenegger used the 1999 compacts as an example of Davis' 
failure to make good decisions that would have helped to balance the state bud-
get—why, after all, hadn't Davis secured a 25 percent share of gaming revenue 
as had Connecticut, whose budget was now well in the black?29 Instead, 
Schwarzenegger asserted, Davis allowed himself to be manipulated by a pow-
erful "special interest group" now positioned by gaming money to buy further 
influence with politicians like Davis and Bustamante.30 
These assertions were encapsulated in a television ad in which 
Schwarzenegger accused gaming tribes of not being willing to pay their "fair 
share" of taxes at a time when the state was facing a severe economic crisis. He 
blasted tribes for using their revenue instead to buy off politicians so that they 
could avoid taking financial responsibility in the state. He then promised that if 
elected he would not be manipulated by such powerful "special interest groups" 
and would instead ensure that tribes were properly taxed.31 By misrepresenting 
tribes as greedy and selfish, and misinforming the public of the legal basis for 
tribal exemptions from federal and state taxes, Schwarzenegger presented him-
self as a powerful political player who would be immune to "special interest 
groups" or their money. Appropriating public criticisms of Davis, Bustamante, 
Enron, and the entire state's energy industry, Schwarzenegger focused attention 
on tribes and tribal gaming revenue in order to skirt the real causes for California's 
Recognition 139 
economic crisis and to obscure his own alliances with President Bush and the 
energy industry as well as the political and corporate sources of his campaign 
financing.32 
The rhetoric was successful. Davis was removed from office and 
Schwarzenegger elected. In his January 2004 State of the State address, 
Schwarzenegger dropped the talk about imposing taxes on tribes (which he could 
not do) and claimed that he "respect[ed] the sovereignty of our Native Ameri-
can tribes" but stated that he "believed" that tribes needed to "respect the eco-
nomic situation that California faces."33 Formally, he wanted tribes to renegoti-
ate the terms of their 1999 compacts to pay a greater share of their revenue to 
the state, suggesting Connecticut's 25 percent as a model, and he announced 
that he would appoint a negotiator to work towards those ends. Aides echoed 
this by frequently emphasizing that Connecticut had earned upwards of $400 
million annually from their share of tribal gaming money. In less formal set-
tings, Schwarzenegger stated cavalierly that tribes in California were "ripping 
us off' by not paying higher percentages of their revenue to the state: "We want 
them to negotiate and pay their fair share."34 
Schwarzenegger quickly announced the appointment of Daniel Kolkey to 
renegotiate the 1999 compacts. Kolkey had worked on the compacts in 1998 as 
legal-affairs secretary to Governor Pete Wilson.35 In interviews with the press, 
Kolkey identified Schwarzenegger's goal as securing $1 to $2 billion annually 
from the tribes, claiming that it was time for them "to pay their fair share" 
because they "have a monopoly on taking gambling proceeds from California 
citizens."36 In 2003, California tribes had earned a total of $4.7 billion from 
gaming, so $1 to 2 billion would have meant a considerable share of their rev-
enues. With both tribes and some legislators criticizing the amount as unrealis-
tic, Schwarzenegger modified it to $500 million and later to $300 million, prom-
ising to use the money specifically on the state's education and transportation 
needs.37 
In July 2004, Schwarzenegger signed compacts with five tribes that had 
amended their 1999 agreements: the United Auburn Indian Community, the 
Rumsey Band of Wintun Indians, the Pauma Band of Mission Indians, the Pala 
Band of Mission Indians, and the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians. The com-
pacts increased tribal payments to the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund ($2 million 
per year) in exchange for allowing the tribes to operate as many slot machines 
as they desired. However, tribes agreed to pay on a progressive scale of up to 
$25,000 per machine based on the total number of machines that they had. Ad-
ditionally, the tribes agreed to pay a $ 1 billion bond over 18 years, amounting to 
about $150 to $200 million per year, until the compacts expire in 2030.38 
Almost immediately, the Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians attempted 
to secure a temporary restraining order against the state from ratifying the com-
pacts, arguing that they would lead to "mega-casinos" that would severely hurt 
existing tribal businesses. U.S. District Court Judge Thomas J. Whelan denied 
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the request, arguing that the governor and the tribes had the authority to negoti-
ate such compacts under IGRA. The legislature and then the BIA almost imme-
diately ratified the agreements.39 
Concurrently, the state negotiated four compacts with tribes that did not 
have 1999 compacts: the Lyrton Band of Porno Indians (which would have meant 
an off-reservation casino in the San Francisco Bay area), the Buena Vista 
Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians, the Ewiiaapaayp Band of Kumeyaay Indians, 
and the Fort Mojave Tribe. Under enormous political pressure over the ques-
tion of off-reservation casinos, the Lytton compact was rescinded. The other 
three were then approved by the legislature and sent to the BIA for approval.40 
In the November 2004 election, the card club and race track industries 
sponsored Proposition 68, which would have allowed them to install slot ma-
chines. The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians countered with Proposition 
70, which was immediately co-sponsored by the San Manuel Band of Mission 
Indians and endorsed by the California Indian Nations Gaming Association (rep-
resenting 64 tribes). Proposition 70 would have cancelled 68 if both had passed, 
allowed slot machines at non-Indian card clubs and race tracks, and fixed tribal 
gaming revenue shares at 8.84 percent.41 
Schwarzenegger mounted huge anti-Proposition 68 and 70 campaigns. In 
the midst of his assault, the sponsors of Proposition 68 stopped their campaign 
efforts and pulled their ads. Schwarzenegger then turned his attentions to Propo-
sition 70, which he claimed belonged in the "special interest hall of fame."42 
"For years, [tribes] have taken advantage of the state They've ripped off the 
state."43 Now, the state was seeking "the right to open up those casino books" 
and betray tribal campaign financing and tax loopholes. He wanted Califor-
nians to trust him to negotiate compacts that would ensure "environmental pro-
tection, labor unions and audits, all while providing millions in revenue for 
state education, health care and transportation." He boasted frequently that the 
five compacts he had already signed were going to garner upwards of $300 
million a year for the state, a figure he would later have to admit was closer to 
$16 million.44 However, the bravado worked and both measures were defeated.45 
After the elections, Schwarzenegger invited gaming tribes back to the ne-
gotiating table. However, all of the more affluent tribes, including Agua Caliente 
and Morongo, ceased negotiations that they had begun that September and de-
manded a public apology for Schwarzenegger's characterization of them as 
greedy, selfish, and corrupted special interest groups out to evade taxes. 
Schwarzenegger refused.46 
With the renegotiations of the 1999 compacts stalled, in May 2005 
Schwarzenegger issued a Proclamation on Tribal Gaming, which spelled out a 
strict policy with regards to signing new gaming compacts with urban-based 
and other landless tribes. Essentially, the state would not negotiate gaming com-
pacts with landless tribes without a strict "buy in" of relevant local, state, and 
federal agencies.47 
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Given the history of California's genocide and dispossession of tribes,48 
and its refusal to fulfill its Public Law 280 obligations to provide police, ambu-
lance, fire, and other social services to tribes, it is nothing short of hypocritical 
for the state to want money from tribes to help balance its own budget.49 State 
claims to being entitled to a greater share of tribal revenue because of a tribal 
monopoly on gaming in the state further disguise the enormous contributions to 
the state's economy that gaming tribes have made as well as the education, 
health care, and other social services that they now provide to their members, 
greatly alleviating the state's financial "burdens" to tribes and tribal peoples. 
Histories Displaced 
Tribal gambling operations have contributed dramatically to the state-wide 
growth of revenues from gaming.50 Nationally, approximately two-thirds of tribes 
with gaming now operate Class II facilities, primarily bingo; and about another 
one-third of gaming tribes run some form of Class III gaming, including slots, 
cards, and racing. In July 1999, the National Gambling Impact Study Commis-
sion reported that tribal gaming revenues had nearly doubled from 1995 to 1999, 
from $5.5 to $9.8 billion. Of the 561 tribes with recognition status, however, 
only 193 (34 percent) participated in gaming and only 27 (5 percent) generated 
more than $100 million annually. Those 27 tribes accounted for about two-
thirds of all tribal gaming revenue, $6.4 billion of the $9.8 billion total.51 In a 
review of the National Indian Gaming Commission Accountability Act of 2005 
ordered by the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, the Congressional 
Budget Office issued a cost assessment that claimed that over the 2000-2004 
period, tribal revenue from gaming has increased an average of 14 percent per 
year to about $19 billion total in 2004.52 
These impressive numbers make it difficult to challenge the now all power-
ful image of the rich gaming Indian. The image is so pervasive that it has be-
come commonplace, including everything from Indians selfishly living a life of 
luxury while states struggle for economic reform (Schwarzenegger's recall cam-
paign), tribes using their new money to buy political influence and skirt taxation 
while the majority of tribes suffer on in poverty {Time magazine's controversial 
coverage of tribal gaming),53 to banter like the Comedy Network's South Park's 
April 30,2003 episode, "Red Man's Greed," in which a rich gaming tribe tries 
to put a superhighway through the town, issuing blankets infected with S ARS to 
residents in order to stop their protests. 
These myriad images—misinformed, distorted, satirical, stupid—greatly 
distort the economic reality confronting the majority of Natives in the U.S. Ac-
cording to the United States Census 2000, American Indians and Alaskan Na-
tives report a 24.5 percent poverty rate compared to the national average of 
11.6 percent. Still, exaggerated representations of the rich gaming Indian per-
sist, fueled by everything from moral outrage over gaming to the "fairness" of 
the legal and economic "benefits" "enjoyed" by gaming tribes. Percolating 
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throughout is a deep resentment of these "rich Indians" because gaming rev-
enues have undermined stereotypes not only of what Indian people should look 
like but what real Indian culture should be, as with Donald Trump's now infa-
mous declaration before a Congressional hearing on IGRA in 1993 that the 
Mashantucket Pequots "don't look like Indians to me. They don't look like 
Indians to me, Sir. And they don't look like Indians to other Indians."54 This 
statement reflects a gross lack of information—or even basic understanding— 
of the broadest strokes of Mashantucket Pequot history, culture, and identity. 
But then, that has never been the point. Or, rather, it is the point. Stereotypes are 
put to work not to contribute to an understanding of the diversity and complex-
ity of tribal histories, cultures, and identities. They are invoked to perpetuate 
racism against Native peoples and to challenge the laws that recognize their 
rights to sovereignty as racist.55 
II. The Deal With Race 
Whiteness 
Cheryl I. Harris's "Whiteness as Property," Tornas Almaguer's Racial Fault 
Lines, Ian F. Haney Lopez's White By Law, and George Lipsitz's The Posses-
sive Investment in Whiteness are some of the works within critical race theory 
that address the politics of "white supremacy" or "white privilege."56 They ar-
gue that the historical origins of white supremacy lie in the deep cultural sense 
of entitlement and privilege that U.S. law has provided to "whites." 
As Lipsitz notes, it is important to keep in mind that "white" is a legal and 
social construct and not a stable referent to a biologically discrete unit or popu-
lation.57 For example, Almaguer has pointed out that, although Mexicans were 
originally granted "white" status in California's State Constitution of 1850, the 
social forces of racialization would disenfranchise Mexicans from that status 
and all commensurate entitlements as soon as the rush to gold brought a dispro-
portionate number of "white" men into the state.58 In other words, "white" is 
historically and culturally contingent and thus inconsistent with present notions 
of race or racial identity. It has been racialized within the processes of social 
formation to privilege European-American descendants, men, heterosexuals, 
and citizens over and against non-whites (including Jews), immigrants, women 
(and children), gays, lesbians, and other third gendered or two-spirit people.59 
As Harris demonstrates, the result is not merely the perpetuation of the legal 
protections of privilege for whites but the legitimation of the sense of entitle-
ment to those protections for whites so identified.60 
The ideologies and institutions of white privilege have deeply informed the 
political perspectives and agendas of movements opposing Native sovereignty. 
The primary aim of the groups and individuals participating in these move-
ments is to protect existing colonial relations of power between whites and 
Natives over lands, resources, and economies. The movements, linked in pow-
erful ways with anti-affirmative action and anti-immigrant efforts, have 
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rearticulated a discourse of civil rights to reassert the legal protections of whites 
to privileged positions over jobs, education, public funding, and lands. In this 
discourse, Native treaties and federal Indian laws have been redefined as dis-
criminating against whites by providing benefits, services, and funds for Na-
tives solely on the basis of race. As if Native treaty and federal law emerged out 
of a historical vacuum, the reverse racism argument reflects a gross level of 
ignorance about ongoing histories of oppression and discrimination that Native 
peoples live within. It also perpetuates resentment and fear over the loss of 
political and economic privilege so firmly entrenched within the law for whites 
as to seem normal and earned. 
In California multiple political campaigns in the 1990s resulted in a num-
ber of statutes that reversed existing state civil rights laws because they were 
perceived to be unfair or to provide services to undeserving populations. In 
1994, Proposition 187 suspended illegal-immigrant access to public education 
and particular social services, including health care, on the grounds that illegal-
immigrants were putting an unfair drain on ever-dwindling state resources.61 
Also in 1994, Proposition 184 enforced a "three strikes you're out" measure 
against "repeat offenders"—primarily affecting members of the lower-class and 
communities of color—on the grounds that the "criminal element" was threat-
ening the safety of good, hard-working, taxpaying citizens.62 In 1996, Proposi-
tion 209 suspended affirmative action policies "in the operation of public em-
ployment, public education, or public contracting." In terms of public educa-
tion, which focussed media attention and student movements during the cam-
paign, the promise was to liberate people of color and women from the bonds of 
special treatment and to provide the same opportunities to all faculty, staff, and 
students for hiring, admission, and funding on the grounds of proven ability.63 
In 1998, Proposition 227 ended bi-lingual education with English-only immer-
sion programs in primary schools under a "one nation under God" slogan that 
promised to establish equal opportunities for immigrants to fully enter United 
States society as good, hard-working taxpayers.64 
In 1999, Proposition 5, the Indian Casino Gaming Initiative, passed, but it 
was quickly challenged by hotel and restaurant labor unions and a consortium 
of self-identified "business and property owners." These groups filed two sepa-
rate lawsuits claiming that the proposition was unconstitutional. The unions 
argued that the measure did not adequately address labor rights issues for tribal 
employees (having failed to effectively organize among tribal casinos, which 
had restricted union access on tribal lands). The consortium of "business and 
property owners" argued that the measure was a form of racial discrimination 
because it provided a virtual monopoly of economic opportunities—and, 
relatedly, the means and access to land acquisition—to Natives solely on the 
basis of race. 
One of the more vocal organizations involved in that suit was Stand Up for 
Californians, which claimed that it "unites over 30 grass roots, citizens' action 
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groups from every corner of California and is widely supported by law enforce-
ment, religious, environmental, business, city council members, county super-
visors and other political leaders."65 In their suit Stand Up maintained that the 
Proposition violated the "constitutional rights of the property and business own-
ers" to fair and equal access to land acquisition and economic development 
based solely on race. As would Schwarzenegger in his recall and anti-Proposi-
tion 70 campaigns in 2003-2004, Stand Up rejected outright the validity of the 
status of tribes as sovereigns with rights to self-determination under U.S. law. 
Instead, they treated Native peoples as an ethnic minority group being provided 
with racially discriminatory benefits and opportunities. 
Proposition 5 was overturned by the California Supreme Court, which ruled 
that the Proposition was illegal because it permitted forms of gambling that 
were not legal under the state's constitution.66 It did not, in other words, respond 
directly to the complaint of racial discrimination though Stand Up claimed vic-
tory. 
Californians for Indian Self-Reliance, a coalition of some 40 tribes spear-
headed by Chairman Mark Macarro of the Pechanga Band of Luiseno Indians 
and Chairwoman Mary Ann Martin-Andreas of the Morongo Band of Mission 
Indians, was successful in getting Proposition 1 A, the Indian Self-Reliance Act, 
passed in March 2000 by a strong majority vote (64.5 percent). The act amended 
the state's constitution to allow for gambling, affirmed existing compacts, and 
allowed for new ones to commence. It also permitted union organizing at tribal 
hotels and restaurants. But the reverse racism argument instanced by Stand Up's 
lawsuit in 1999, and later by Schwarzenegger's recall and anti-Proposition 70 
campaigns in 2003-2004, was well entrenched in a broader political terrain of 
movements against tribal sovereignty.67 
Affecting Discrimination Against Whites 
As noted, the Citizens for Equal Rights Alliance (CERA)68 maintains that 
the very notion of Native sovereignty within the law establishes discriminatory 
differences between United States citizens and Native peoples that make it 
impossible for everyone to have equal access to constitutionally-defined and 
guaranteed rights. But while claiming that they are seeking to protect the consti-
tutionally protected civil rights of all U.S. citizens, CERA maintains that it is 
whites who are being discriminated against or adversely affected by federal 
Indian law. This anti-Native sovereignty stance is forcefully represented by 
CERA's support of Harold Fred Rice's lawsuit against the State of Hawai'i in 
Rice v. Cayetano.69 
In 1893, ignoring the terms of previous treaties with the United States af-
firming Native Hawaiian sovereignty, U.S. military and businessmen illegally 
annexed the islands from the Hawaiian Kingdom and deposed and incarcerated 
Queen Lili'uokalani.70 In 1894, the military-business alliance, with support from 
missionaries, established a provisional government.71 This government claimed 
jurisdiction over the islands, including the control of 1.8 million acres defined 
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by treaties as Hawaiian Kingdom and Crown Lands, and ceded these lands to 
the United States government in the Newlands Resolution of 1898.72 The ces-
sion came with the stipulation that any moneys derived from the lease of the 
lands would be reserved "solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawai-
ian Islands for educational and other public purposes."73 In doing so, the Reso-
lution recognized that the lands were being held in a trust status by the United 
States government for the benefit of the "inhabitants of the Hawaiian islands." 
This was affirmed in the Organic Act of 1900, which incorporated Hawai'i as a 
territory of the United States.74 
In 1920, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act reserved 200,000 acres of 
the Hawaiian Kingdom and Crown Lands for the express "use and occupancy" 
of Native Hawaiians.75 The act provided that those who were qualified to "use 
or occupy" the lands would be those "'native Hawaiians' defined as 'descen-
dent^ with at least one-half blood quantum of individuals inhabiting the 
Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778.'"76 The blood quantum criterion was designed 
to distinguish between the land rights of the descendants of the original Native 
Hawaiian inhabitants living in the islands before 1778 and those who claimed 
to be "native" to the islands as descendants of immigrants born in Hawai'i after 
1778.77 
As J. Kehaulani Kauanui (Native Hawaiian) observes in her generative work 
on Native Hawaiian sovereignty, Hawai'i was included among the United Na-
tions's list of non-self-governing territories in 1946.78 Under UN policy, this 
inclusion made Hawai'i eligible for decolonization. Contravening UN policy, 
the United States held a referendum in Hawai'i in 1959 that allowed residents to 
vote only on whether or not to continue as a territory or to be incorporated as a 
state. As Kauanui points out, according to UN criteria for decolonization, inde-
pendence should also have been an option. The election went to statehood. 
The Admissions Act of 1959 transferred the management of the 200,000 
acres for Native Hawaiians from federal to state control and provided that the 
lands should be "held by the State as a public trust for the native Hawaiians and 
the general public."79 In 1978, as a result of Native Hawaiian political protest 
over the mismanagement of their resources by the state, the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs (OH A) was established to administer the terms of relations between the 
United States and Native Hawaiians and, specifically, to manage the trust lands 
and revenue.80 As an affirmation of Native Hawaiian self-government, the nine 
trustees who direct OHA are elected by Native Hawaiians and must be of Na-
tive Hawaiian descent.81 
The Apology Bill of 1993, sponsored by Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Hawai'i), 
recognized that the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom had been illegal. It 
asserted that "the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their 
claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to 
the United States, either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or refer-
endum."82 
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Thus, the treaty history between the United States and the Hawaiian King-
dom recognized and affirmed Native Hawaiian rights to self-government, terri-
torial integrity, and cultural autonomy as specific exercises of a soverign power. 
Recognition of Hawaiian sovereignty was explicitly acknowledged by the 
Newlands Resolution, the Organic Act, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 
the Admissions Act, and the Apology Bill. In each instance, while Native Ha-
waiians were being denied their sovereign rights in actions that violated exist-
ing international treaties and U.S. federal statutes, they were also being recog-
nized as possessing a unique legal status and trust relationship with the U.S. 
government that afforded them protections of their rights as sovereigns. Thus, 
the OH A was clearly established with the purpose of administering the terms of 
this relationship. Moreover, over 160 federal statutes have further acknowl-
edged that Native Hawaiians possess a status and relationship with the U.S. 
government that is akin to the status and rights of American Indians and Alas-
kan Natives. 
In summary, Native Hawaiian treaty history with the United States firmly 
established the recognition of Native Hawaiian rights to self-government and 
territorial integrity by the United States. Recognition of Hawaiian sovereignty 
was acknowledged further in the Newlands Resolution, the Organic Act, the 
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, the Admissions Act, and the Apology Bill. 
Concurrently, over 160 federal statutes have acknowledged that Native Hawai-
ians possess a status and relationship with the United States government that is 
akin to the status and rights of American Indians and Alaskan Natives. Thus, 
when OHA was established, its purpose was to administer the terms of the U.S. 
treaty and federal laws acknowledging and protecting Native Hawaiian sover-
eignty and self-determination.83 
In 1996, Harold Fred Rice applied to vote in the OHA elections and was 
denied on the grounds that he is not Native Hawaiian. Rice sued Governor Ben-
jamin J. Cayetano (D-Hawai'i), as the highest representative of the state, for 
violating his Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. He argued that OHA's 
restriction of voting to Native Hawaiians amounted to a denial of his right to 
vote for a state elected office and discriminated that right on the basis of race. 
He cited the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act's definition of Native Hawai-
ians by a 50 percent blood descent as defining Native Hawaiians as a race and 
not as a sovereign people—because blood proxied for race. He lost the case at 
both the state and appeal levels on the grounds of Morton v. Mancari (1974).84 
In 1974, non-Indian employees of the Albuquerque, New Mexico, branch 
of the BIA brought a class-action suit against the BIA's hiring preference for 
qualified American Indians as provided for by the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934. Morton et al. argued that Indian-preference contravened the anti-discrimi-
nation provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972 and de-
prived them their rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. The New Mexico District Court held that Indian-preference was 
repealed by the 1972 statute and ordered that the BIA cease implementing it. 
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Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the order on two grounds. First, 
the Court found that Congress did not intend to repeal Indian-preference hiring 
in the BIA with the 1972 statute and that Indian-preference was a "longstanding, 
important component of the Government's Indian program."85 Second, the Court 
ruled that Indian-preference did not constitute "invidious racial discrimination" 
as argued by the plaintiffs but was "reasonable and rationally designed" to fur-
ther Indian self-government: 
The Indian preference does not constitute "racial discrimina-
tion" or even "racial" preference, but is rather an employ-
ment criterion designed to further the cause of Indian self-
government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs 
of its constituent groups. As long as the special treatment of 
Indians can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' 
unique obligation toward Indians, such legislative judgments 
will not be disturbed.86 
In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted "American Indians" as a legal, 
not a racial category. This decision affirmed the unique legal status of American 
Indians in relationship to the U.S. government and recognized that their distinc-
tive status afforded Indians inalienable rights to self-government as affirmed by 
the Indian Reorganization Act. The Court acknowledged that Congress is obli-
gated to protect those rights by not passing legislation that impedes the abilities 
of American Indians to exercise them.87 
The District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found similarly in 
Rice v. Cayetano. Both courts ruled that "Native Hawaiians" was not a racial, 
but a legal, category owing to Native Hawaiian status and rights to self-govern-
ment based on the historical precedents of relations with the United States. Fol-
lowing Morton v. Mancari, they found enormous legal precedent in 160 federal 
statutes for recognizing that Native Hawaiians had a legal status akin to Ameri-
can Indians and Alaskan Natives. This, they reasoned, necessitated the restric-
tion of the vote for the OHA trustees to Native Hawaiians in a manner 
analogous to the Indian Reorganization Act's Indian hiring preference within 
the BIA. 
However, in February 2000, the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme 
Court reasoned that "Native Hawaiians" were not akin in status or rights to 
American Indians and that, by implication, the OHA was not akin to the BIA. 
This was based on the Court's interpretation of the Hawaiian Homes Commis-
sion Act's definition of "Native Hawaiians." The 50 percent blood quantum 
criterion, the Supreme Court said, functioned as a definition of descent that 
proxied for race.88 Therefore, the Court concluded, the OHA elections were 
unconstitutionally discriminating the right to vote for OHA trustees on the basis 
of race. 
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Rice v. Cayetano has provided precedent for further legal challenges of 
Native Hawaiian self-government. In 2002, U.S. District Judge Susan Oki 
Mollway denied a temporary restraining order filed against the Office of Ha-
waiian Affairs and the Hawaiian Homes Commission.89 Sixteen plaintiffs90 filed 
suit against both agencies for providing "race-based programs" for Native Ha-
waiians (i.e., for using state moneys to fund programs restricted on the basis of 
race). Arakaki v. Lingle has since been filed in federal court, followed by Doe v. 
Kamehameha Schools in 2005. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Rice v. Cayetano contributed to the 
reracialization of Native Hawaiian status and rights in direct negation of Native 
Hawaiian sovereignty and self-determination. The ideologies and practices of 
racialization are a foundational element of anti-Native sovereignty movements. 
By configuring Native status and rights as a matter of race and racially-derived 
benefits and privileges, Native peoples are alienated from their status as sover-
eigns under international and constitutional law and resituated as ethnic minori-
ties under federal/state agency. 
It is not merely coincidental or curious, then, that CERA supported Rice's 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The history of Native Hawaiian annexation 
and subjugation to the United States is a history of the legal-military establish-
ment and protection of white privilege in Hawai'i -within both the state govern-
ment and over the economy, lands, and resources of Hawai'i.91 Disavowing this 
history,92 CERA and Rice have claimed that Native Hawaiian voting rights for 
OHA trustees was racially discriminatory. They would have everyone believe 
that equality existed in Hawai'i before Native Hawaiians were given special 
rights to self-government and special benefits of access to the lands over and 
against those of whites. They would like to see the legal distinctions between 
Native Hawaiians and whites erased so that this once pristine equality under the 
law can return to the state. Unsurprisingly, CERA has not taken up with similar 
passion the cause of Arakaki et al., no doubt because the plaintiffs include Asian 
Americans. 
The anti-Native arguments in Hawai'i are markedly similar to and intri-
cately connected with anti-recognition efforts throughout the United States. These 
efforts are aimed at the dissolution of Native self governments, economic self-
determination, and land rights. They have evolved into "reform" movements 
contesting treaty and federal Indian laws on the grounds that they provide "un-
fair" legal advantages and economic monopolies to tribes on the basis of race. 
The "sovereign immunity" of tribes from civil lawsuits,93 the exemption of tribes 
from state taxation,94 and the protection of tribes from certain aspects of state 
jurisdiction95 have each been of particular concern to elected officials who have 
argued that tribes enjoy "too many" legal protections, resulting in unfair legal 
immunities, tax breaks, and juridical exemptions from state and local controls— 
as if those "protections" unsettled an existing equality between Natives and 
non-Natives in the United States. 
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III. Reckoning Trust 
Racist ideologies and practices of white privilege are a permanent feature 
of processes of social formation within the United States.96 As have affirmative 
action laws for communities of color and women, the provision of Native rights 
to sovereignty and self-determination in treaty and federal law represent recog-
nition that the long-term social inequities under which Native peoples have lived 
are a direct result of histories of oppression and discrimination.97 Thus, the pro-
visions for Native self-government, territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy 
within United States law not only conform to constitutional and international 
laws regarding the status and rights of "indigenous peoples" to self-determina-
tion.98 They also recognize that the historical realities and structures of racism 
within the United States have made these legal protections necessary. 
Anti-Native sovereignty movements reject the historical legacies, practices, 
and effects of racism on Native peoples. Anti-gaming and anti-recognition ef-
forts have relied heavily on a discourse that is dismissive of the impact and 
legacy of colonialism on Natives. The entire logic of "reverse racism" is depen-
dent on the negation of the realities of racism. Only within such a negation can 
the privileges, benefits, and entitlements of whiteness be made to appear nor-
mal, and even earned. This has all been made painfully clear, yet again, in the 
proposed reforms of the federal trust responsibilities to tribes initiated by Cobell 
v. Norton (1996)." 
In 1996, Elouise Cobell (Blackfeet), co-founder and chair of the Blackfeet 
National Bank and then treasurer of the Blackfeet Nation, filed a class-action 
lawsuit against the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the BIA. Cobell ques-
tioned the efficacy of the BIA's management of Blackfeet reservation and indi-
vidual trust lands. Unable to secure an accurate record of leases, sales, and 
individual trust land payments from the BIA, Cobell decided to join forces with 
the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) to address these issues on a national 
scale. The aim was to secure BIA records on their leasing of reservation and 
individual trust lands for agriculture, grazing, timber, and resource extraction 
and the gross inconsistencies in BIA payments to the individuals in whose names 
those leases had been signed.100 
The leasing of tribal lands originated with the General Allotment Act of 
1887, which broke up reservations and issued single parcels to individuals who 
were determined to be members.101 There was a 160-acre norm for determining 
the size of a parcel but other factors were also taken into consideration, like the 
value of the land and the status of the individual with regards to age, marriage, 
and dependency. Consequently, parcels ranged in size from about 40 to 700 
acres, with "heads of households" receiving more than "widows" and "orphans" 
and desert lands being given more liberally than lands deemed valuable in terms 
of agriculture, timber, oil, and mineral deposits.102 
Because only tribal members could receive allotments, rolls were insti-
tuted by the BIA to record the names of all legitimate members. These rolls 
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identify an individual's paternal and maternal blood degree, age, marriage sta-
tus, number of dependents, and orphan status. BIA agents were directed to use 
this information, as well as personal evaluations of the "competency" of indi-
viduals ascertained from interviews, to determine the size and location of the 
parcels and the type of titles to be issued to individual tribal members.103 Those 
who were deemed "competent" were issued fee patents. With fee patents came 
U.S. citizenship and thus obligations to pay state and federal taxes. Fluency in 
English became a key device in determining "competency" because it was in-
terpreted to mean the individual understood the demands of private property 
ownership, taxation, and citizenship. 
Those tribal members who were deemed "incompetent" were issued trust 
patents, which indicated that an individual did not speak English or was an 
orphan or widow with dependents requiring federal assistance. Those who were 
issued trust patents were not granted U.S. citizenship. Trust patents were sup-
posed to be held in trust for a period not to exceed twenty-five years, or until 
that time that individuals proved themselves "competent."104 
The key administrative issue in the distribution of the patents was expedi-
ency. Overwhelmed by the number of applicants from around the country,105 the 
demands of interviewing and evaluating all applicants to determine their eligi-
bility for tribal enrollment and then their qualifications for managing private 
property ownership, as well as regional and congressional pressure to hasten 
allotment and so statehood out of Indian territories, BIA agents came to rely on 
blood quantum and English fluency to determine patent type.106 Generally speak-
ing, those enrolled with less than 50 percent Indian blood and who spoke En-
glish were taken to be assimilated enough that they no longer required federal 
"guardianship" and were issued full land title and U.S. citizenship. Those en-
rolled with 50 percent or more Indian blood and who did not speak fluent En-
glish were assumed to be still too much tied to their tribal customs that they 
were in need of federal assistance and so were issued trust patents. Because the 
rolls did not include a record of language fluency, blood degree became a more 
expeditious means to issuing land titles.107 The record of blood degree, how-
ever, was dependent on a myriad of social factors, including everything from 
federal agents guessing or making visual evaluations of physical features to the 
false testimony of those who turned over the names of tribal members for cash 
payments.108 
The Burke Act of 1906 suspended trust patents in favor of fee titles in order 
to hasten the allotment process.109 However, the rolls and, in particular, the record 
of blood degree that they preserved, had served to institute federal enrollment 
policies. Despite evidence of extensive errors and omissions in the information 
recorded on the rolls, Congress consistently upheld their legal status. In the 
context of several court cases well into the 1930s, Congress ruled that the rolls 
were "conclusive evidence" of tribal membership, solidifying all of the infor-
mation on them as legal proof of tribal identity.110 Consequently, all of the prob-
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lems with the production of the rolls were legally secured, as were the land titles 
and leases that had been issued on their basis. 
Once the allotment process was completed for a given reservation, the "sur-
plus," or unallotted lands, were opened up for sale and leasing. The notorious 
result was the reduction of tribal reservation lands from about 138 to about 48 
million acres from 1887 to 1934,111 with the overwhelming majority of those 90 
million acres being bought by federal agents, oil and mineral companies, and 
U.S. citizens for agricultural and timber operations.112 
Lesser known outside of Indian country, at least until Cobell v. Norton, was 
how allotment brought about the leasing out and sale of individually-held trust 
lands. Non-members were able to buy up or secure insanely long leases on 
allotments that the BIA was supposed to be holding in trust for a period not to 
exceed 25 years on behalf of individuals whom the BIA was supposed to be 
educating in the demands of private property ownership and U.S. citizenship.113 
In each sale or lease, the BIA claimed to be fulfilling the best of its trust 
obligations. However, the BIA used allotment to assume an even greater level 
of control over tribes, tribal members, and their lands. As the plaintiff's attor-
neys in Cobell have argued, the BIA used allotment to seize management of 
tribal lands114 in the name of fulfilling its trust obligations to protect individual 
members from fraud or failure to pay taxes. BIA agents—not buying up "sur-
plus" lands for themselves!—leased out individual trust lands for periods that 
far exceeded what the law allowed and for fees that were nominal at best. Mon-
eys owed on the leases were supposed to be collected by the BIA on behalf of 
the allottees and deposited into Individual Indian Money (IIM) accounts with 
the Department of the Treasury. After the BIA took a lion's share of the money 
to cover "administrative expenses," the rest (a small percentage) was supposed 
to be paid to the individuals, or their legal guardians or heirs, in whose names 
the leases had been signed and the IIM accounts created.115 
The original purpose of Cobell's 1996 lawsuit was to force the DOI and the 
BIA to produce records of names of all leasees and allottees, an account of all 
of the moneys collected from the leases, and a record of the amounts distributed 
to the allottees. From the beginning, however, the DOI and the BIA have been 
unable to produce the required documentation. Instead, what has been revealed 
is that roughly 44 million annual transactions in IIM accounts have taken place 
since 1887 without any record or accounting systems to assess the accuracy of 
the transactions—both in and out of the IIM accounts.116 
When originally filed in 1996, there were about 50,000 plaintiffs in Cobell. 
That number has since grown to about 500,000, as individuals have come for-
ward to report suspected fraud in the loss or misuse of their family's allotments 
and trust moneys. From the original estimate of $2.5 billion in missing funds, 
NARF now believes that the total amount is closer to $175 billion. These are 
moneys that have come into IIM accounts and have not been paid out to tribal 
members. Instead, preliminary DOI and BIA documents show that the moneys 
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have been diverted from IIM accounts to cover other DOI expenses, such as the 
construction of federal highways and dams. 
In response to contempt of order charges and penalties for failing to pro-
duce court-ordered documentation, and in an attempt to avoid being placed in 
receivership by presiding Judge Royce C. Lamberth, in 2001 the DOI and BIA 
made a proposal for the reform of federal trust responsibilities and administra-
tion. It was first presented to tribal representatives at the November general 
assembly meeting of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) in 
Spokane, Washington.117 Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton and then Assis-
tant Secretary Neal McCaleb proposed to create an entirely new Bureau of In-
dian Trust Assets Management (BITAM) under the DOI. BITAM would be re-
sponsible both for the overhaul of the leases and IIM accounts implicated in 
Cob ell and for the administration of all relevant tribal financial and land assets. 
The BIA would, then, be relieved of its trust responsibilities and reformed to 
administrate "social services" to tribes. 
NCAI delegates voted unanimously to reject the proposal. Their response 
was based on several factors. One of the most compelling of these was that the 
DOI and BIA had developed their proposal without any tribal consultation, vio-
lating EO #13175. While McCaleb reassured the assembly that he was there, in 
fact, to consult with the tribes, several tribal representatives insisted that the 
principles of tribal consultation required by EO #13175 demanded their in-
volvement in the development of the proposal, not merely in its modification. 
An equally charged issue informing the NCAI's rejection of the proposal 
was its separation of trust and social services. Several tribal representatives 
argued that to divide these two central aspects of the U.S. government's trust 
obligations to tribes would lead to the final erosion of tribal sovereignty. In 
other words, differentiating trust from social services would shift Native status 
from that of sovereigns to that of ethnic minority. Rearticulating Natives as 
ethnic minorities would have the effect of reracializing them as beneficiaries of 
public services under federal administration. This, in turn, would negate consti-
tutional and federal laws that recognized tribal sovereignty and rights to self-
determination. Tribal representatives, then, perceived the restructuring of the 
BIA as a "social service" provider, with BITAM functioning as a land manage-
ment agency, as the final straw in the collapse of tribal rights. 
This concern had been heightened by the release of a 2001 GAO report on 
the FAP (less than a month before NCAI's meeting). Initiated by Congressional 
members from the northeast and their political allies, themselves allied in anti-
recognition as anti-gaming efforts throughout New England,118 the GAO report 
was supposed to address problems with FAR In that vein, it made several im-
portant observations about under-funding and under-staffing, inconsistencies 
with what kinds of documentation were required to fulfill the seven criteria for 
recognition, and the various discrepancies in time to decisions. However, the 
weight of the report was addressed to gaming—to how many recognized tribes 
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game, how much money they earn from gaming, how many tribes had recently 
applied for recognition solely to open Class III facilities, and how recognized 
tribes qualify to share in what was represented to be an extravagant amount of 
federal dollars reserved exclusively for them (in 2001, a mere $4 billion to 
support federal and treaty responsibilities to 562 tribes and their 2 million mem-
bers). Invoking a now familiar reverse racism argument, the report indicted the 
lack of fairness in gaming laws that allowed people with dubious claims to 
tribal identity to open lucrative enterprises operating at unfair economic advan-
tage and legal immunity over other U.S. citizens.119 
IV. A Call for Deracialization 
Schwarzenegger's recall and anti-Proposition 70 campaigns, Rice v. 
Cayetano, and the BIA's proposal of trust reform in light of Cobell v. Norton are 
all instances of anti-Native sovereignty movements within the United States. 
These movements are articulated through a discourse of reverse racism that 
works to maintain the privileges and benefits of whiteness. Claims that Natives 
are now taking advantage of legal loopholes and unfair tax breaks, lapping up 
economic monopolies and undue political influence—all while maybe not even 
being really Native at all!—depends on a disingenuous and conveniently misin-
formed disavowal of the law and the histories, structures, and institutions of 
oppression and discrimination within which Native peoples live. The decima-
tion of 98 percent of the Native population, the dispossession from 99 percent 
of the lands in the United States, the continued poverty, unemployment, and 
high-school drop-out rates that characterize Native life, the disproportionate 
incarceration, death, and suicide rates among Native communities... .120 These 
are the material realities that define Native social relations and conditions within 
the United States. The survival of Native populations, the reacquisition of tribal 
lands post-allotment (less than 10 million acres), and the all-too-modest moves 
towards some economic self-sufficiency provided by gaming are hardly the stuff 
of the privileges, benefits, and entitlements that come with whiteness. 
Native oppositional strategies to the ideologies and institutions of white-
ness, and towards the decolonization of Native social relations and conditions, 
demand an active deracialization of Native status and rights. As the ruling in 
Rice v. Cayetano warns, andArakaki v. Lingle and Doe v. Kamehameha Schools 
forebode, Native peoples must continue to assert their unique legal status as 
sovereign nations under the precepts and provisions of international and consti-
tutional law. Natives must reject any laws or administrative practices that have 
racialized or validated the racialization of Native status and rights. As Rice and 
Arakaki demonstrate, this must include a rejection of blood quantum require-
ments for determining tribal membership or land rights. For while the U.S. Su-
preme Court affirmed in Morton v. Mancari that "American Indian" was a legal 
category and remanded questions of membership to tribal courts on the matter 
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of gender-based discrimination under the Indian Reorganization and Civil Rights 
Acts of 1934 and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978),121 it is not as clear in 
the post-Rice moment that they would do so if the complaint was race-based. 
Native peoples must take proactive measures to prepare themselves for such 
challenges. 
But even more importantly to the decolonization of Native communities, 
Native peoples must deracialize their concepts of membership, belonging, and 
relatedness. The ideological force of race and racism within Native communi-
ties and governance must be taken on directly, thoughtfully, and responsibly 
with the aim of decolonizing Native social relationships and governance struc-
tures and policies. This must be done not only as a proactive measure against 
possible legal threats, but as the necessary, ethical thing to do for the intellec-
tual and spiritual health and well-being of Native peoples. 
Still, any time someone argues against racism and implies that tribes do 
away with blood quantum membership criteria, the responses invariably include 
accusations or concerns that what is being proposed is an "anybody can be an 
Indian" mentality. This is incredibly disingenuous. Native customary laws for 
determining the interrelated concepts of membership, relationship, and respon-
sibility are incredibly discriminating and absolutely do not—despite the clichés 
about the Wannabe Tribe—invite everyone in. Genealogical practices, relation-
ships to ecosystems and specific lands, inheritance laws, customs regarding 
adoption, marriage and naturalization, and beliefs about social responsibilities 
within extended family units are radical concepts of membership that are nei-
ther open-ended nor non-discriminating. So, why not treat these practices, and 
the cultures and epistemologies in which they are defined and from which they 
emanate, as the authority for determining who is and who is not Native? 
It could begin with dismantling the discourse. Instead of "tribal member-
ship"—implying tribes are like clubs with dues and operating hours—why not 
create tribal citizenship, naturalization, and immigration laws? Why can't tribes 
use the language of nations and regulate citizenship and immigration accord-
ingly? Why can't tribes base these laws on their own genealogical practices, 
inheritance laws, customs regarding adoption, marriage and naturalization, and 
beliefs about relationships to ecosystems, specific lands, and extended family 
units? Imagine the possibilities for a truly radical reform of tribal governance 
and social relations if "blood" and "race" were made irrelevant? 
This is not to imply that Native peoples are not confronted with myriad 
social forces of oppression and discrimination. These forces include an incred-
ible surge and fraud in new applications for membership, particularly in tribes 
with gaming, and have resulted not only in questions about the legitimacy of 
Native identity and culture but also an entire mire of legal pressures for tribes to 
revisit-to wards-restricting their membership requirements. 
The challenge for Native peoples is not to allow these social forces of op-
pression and discrimination to determine the terms or concepts of their gover-
nance, membership, and social relationships. Decisions with such important 
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long-term consequences must be thoughtfully considered, mindful of recent 
political movements to racialize Native status as a means of refuting Native 
treaty and land rights and accountable to the customs and traditions that define 
Native identity and culture. 
The GAO report and the BIA's proposal for reform clearly demonstrate 
that recognition policies are a target of anti-Native forces and their concerted 
attacks on Native sovereignty. Because of the political pressures on the BIA at 
this time, reforms will be made in FAP and to the trust relationship. The ques-
tion is, to what ends? Will the institutions of white supremacy inform the struc-
ture of the reforms to affirm and reinforce, yet again, white privileges over 
Native governments and lands? These are difficult questions that demand po-
litical vigilance and inter-tribal alliance. 
Perhaps Native governments and organizations should establish their own 
mechanisms for recognizing one another and financially and legally assisting in 
one another's efforts at land reacquisition and economic development. Imagine 
the political implications if a powerful organization like the NCAI were to 
defederalize their criteria for membership and allow unrecognized tribes to par-
ticipate as voting delegates, along the lines of non-governmental organizations 
within the United Nations. Or what if the Blackfeet National Bank were to be-
gin a loan program to federally unrecognized tribes for land reacquisition and 
economic development projects? The point is to get outside the political lega-
cies of plenary power doctrines, colonialism, and racism and to reimagine the 
possibilities for Native governance and social relationships. Only then will the 
possibilities for Native sovereignty and self-determination—and any real kind 
of decolonization—be realized. 
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